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Ethnocentrism: Lessons 
from Richard Rorty to 
Randy David
This article engages Richard Rorty’s controversial concept of ethnocentrism with the 
help of Randolf (Randy) S. David’s writings. The ﬁrst section deﬁnes Rorty’s concept 
of ethnocentrism and responds to the general criticisms of relativism and divisiveness 
that have been made against it. The second section suggests a conceptual replacement 
for Rorty’s notion of a vicious ethnocentrism: egotism. Egotism is a kind of cultural 
ethnocentrism that is resistant to openness, creativity, and social transformation. 
Inspired by David’s work, the third and ﬁnal section suggests how the concepts of 
ethnocentrism and egotism might be of some use as conceptual tools for articulating 
contemporary social issues in the Philippines.
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populism
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The struggle spans generations (Photo by Carlo Gabuco)
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INTRODUCTION
&thnocentrism is a controversial concept in the writings of the American pragmatist Richard Rorty. Generally speaking, ethnocentrism is the view that individuals and societies are 
fashioned through their particular ethnos or culture. Brieﬂy, the view 
is that all persons and groups are historically situated and acculturated 
products of contingency, language, and environment (Rorty 1991:2,13-
14). This ethnocentric stance is seen to be at odds with the notion that 
there are objective and widely shared ideas and values across human 
cultures. It puts in doubt the philosophical capacity to make universal 
claims about the nature of persons and groups. It complicates the ability 
to formulate systematic and wide-reaching social and moral theories. It 
also calls into question the ability of cultures to engage in practices of 
social transformation and meaningful dialogue. Rorty’s critics, as we 
shall see later on, judge the position of ethnocentrism as relativistic, 
divisive, and even silly. Rorty’s retort is that it is even more silly to think 
that aiming for a uniﬁed theory of inquiry is the best way to go with any 
social or moral theory, let alone any theory. He has misgivings about 
using the objectivist-relativist binary as a tool for analyzing morality 
and culture ([1996] 1999:xix). He also ﬁnds it regressive to presume that 
unconditional moral and cultural universals exist (Rorty [1994] 1999). 
Rorty’s ethnocentrism claims that societies simply work with whatever 
historical truths and moral realities they have developed so far. For 
Rorty, the most admirable persons and groups can fruitfully converse 
with each other despite their diﬀerences. He also thinks that the liberal 
ethnos exempliﬁes this culture of tolerance, open-mindedness, and 
cosmopolitanism at best.
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Randolf “Randy” S. David, a Filipino sociologist, journalist, and 
an inﬂuential public ﬁgure, shares Rorty’s view of the importance of 
pluralism, openness, and conversation in social life. Both envision 
inspiring versions of the United States and the Philippines in their roles 
as academics and public intellectuals (see Rorty 1998, 1999; David 1999, 
2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2016a). More than any other Filipino theorist, David 
has authoritatively shown how Rorty’s pragmatism can oﬀer incisive 
and persuasive ways of unpacking contemporary social issues in the 
Philippines. In “An American Thinker” (2007), David credits Rorty with 
having had a big inﬂuence on his own research: 
My encounter with the work of Rorty has led me to a radical rethinking 
of my own discipline—sociology. Today I approach my work in the same 
pragmatist spirit in which Rorty views all intellectual activity: “We cannot 
regard truth as a goal of inquiry. The purpose of inquiry is to achieve agreement 
among human beings about what to do, to bring about consensus on the ends to 
be achieved and the means to be used to achieve those ends. Inquiry that does 
not achieve coordination of behavior is not inquiry, but simply wordplay.” 
(Rorty [1996] 1999:xxv)
In my view, David’s nuanced interpretations of Rorty can participate 
in addressing criticisms against Rorty’s ethnocentrism. In addition, a 
reworked version of Rorty’s ethnocentrism can be valuable in analyzing 
particular issues in the Philippines that David himself is concerned about 
at present. In the spirit of pragmatic inquiry, this article aims to spell out 
a clearer, more workable notion of Rorty’s ethnocentrism by drawing 
on David’s body of published work for contextualization. By connecting 
Rorty and David, the article will show the applied value of Rorty’s 
unpacked work on ethnocentrism in research on the Philippines.
This essay is divided into three sections. In the ﬁrst section, I provide 
a preview of Rorty’s ethnocentrism. I reveal and respond to areas in 
which Rorty’s concept of ethnocentrism is vulnerable to the criticism of 
relativism and divisiveness. In the second section, I take up the task of 
oﬀering a more well-deﬁned conception of Rorty’s ethnocentrism. I argue 
that the ethnocentrism that Rorty’s critics are afraid of (or should be afraid 
of) is the egotistic version of it—a kind of cultural ethnocentrism that is 
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resistant to openness, creativity, and social transformation. Egotism, in 
other words, can serve as the conceptual replacement to Rorty’s notion 
of a vicious form of ethnocentrism. Finally, in the third and ﬁnal section, 
I suggest how ethnocentrism and egotism might be of some use as 
conceptual tools for articulating the social situation in the Philippines. 
An unpacked version of Rorty’s work, in my view, can help us rethink 
populism, egotistic local cultures, and the challenge of articulating a 
national identity or ethnos in Philippine research.
ETHNOCENTRISM
In the introduction to Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, Rorty (1991:15) 
admits that what aroused hostility and suspicion among his critics in 
the 1980s was his ambiguous use of the term in his various essays (see 
Bernstein 1987, Norris 1986, Comay 1986, Fraser 1989, Lentricchia 
1983a, 1983b, and Fisk 1985). To clarify his position, Rorty argues that 
the concept of ethnocentrism should be understood in two senses: the 
general and the local. Ethnocentrism in the ﬁrst sense can be interpreted 
as “an inescapable condition,” a deﬁnition that is in line with the general 
reality of “human ﬁnitude.” For Rorty, all persons and communities are as 
culture-dependent as they are ﬁnite and contingent. Bound within the limits 
of his or her particular community, Rorty contends that a person’s ethnos 
only “comprises those who share enough of one’s beliefs to make fruitful 
conversation possible” ([1985] 1991:30). This ethnocentric exclusivity 
means that privileging one’s own group comes naturally, and that there 
can be no non-circular justiﬁcation for this preference (1985:29). It also 
means that the community is the arbiter of its own ethics: it supplies the 
legitimation for what is or is not morally reprehensible in the culture. As 
David (2006b) correctly says of Rorty’s thinking: 
To the extent that they are skills or tools of survival in a changing 
environment, cultures may be simple or complex, eﬀective or ineﬀective 
in solving problems. But there is nothing in the world, said the philosopher 
Richard Rorty, that can tell us “what culture it would be best to belong to.” 
I take this to mean that cultures cannot be measured or evaluated except on 
their own terms or in relation to the purposes they deﬁne for their adherents. 
They are, in short, incommensurable. 
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Ethnocentrism in the second sense can be interpreted as referring to 
one’s loyalty to a speciﬁc ethnos or local culture. Rorty’s cultural ethnos 
is unapologetically Western-centric and liberal. His ethnos, in his own 
words, refers to a kind of “loyalty to the socio-political culture” of what 
the Marxists used to call “bourgeois democracies” and what Roberto 
Unger calls, more neutrally, “the rich North Atlantic democracies” (Rorty 
1991:15). To the ire of his critics, he often employs this we-syntax in 
a way that authoritatively speaks on behalf of the group identities he 
identiﬁes with; examples include “we liberals,” “we pragmatists,” “we 
Americans,” and the like. Sardonically, Bernstein (1987:554) notes that 
“sometimes it seems as if what Rorty means by ‘we’ are ‘all those who 
agree with me.’” 
Rorty’s general and local distinctions of ethnocentrism have both been 
met with reproach. The general claim that ethnocentrism is an “inescapable 
condition” has connections to the charge of relativism, which in turn 
gives rise to the view that all cultures are morally equal and all values 
are morally on par. If cultures deﬁne what they do and do not do, and if 
individuals are answerable to the network of communities they belong 
to, on what basis can cultural practices then be criticized and challenged? 
Put more speciﬁcally, how can cultural wrongs be justiﬁed and corrected? 
In his critique of Rorty, Will Kymlicka points out how an ethnocentric 
perspective can give rise to the relativist problem of moral justiﬁcation: 
“When a Muslim woman in Egypt says ‘Sexual discrimination is wrong’, 
she does not mean ‘We don’t do that around here.’ On the contrary, she 
is saying this precisely because it is done around there, and has always 
been done, and is very ﬁrmly embedded in all the myths, symbols, and 
institutions of their history and society” (1989:65-66). In this case, there 
must be something more authoritative that she should be able to appeal 
to—typically, a transcendent value or a universal moral ideal—in order 
to justify her claim that sexual discrimination is a form of injustice. If 
left solely to her culture, she would ﬁnd no strong empirical validation to 
justify her assertion. 
But Rorty’s general view of ethnocentrism can be clariﬁed by 
distinguishing two separate claims. While he agrees that values and 
practices are relative to culture, it would be a mistake to think that he regards 
all values and practices as morally equal. As he states in “Postmodernist 
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Bourgeois Liberalism” ([1983] 1991), we can separate the claim that 
“every community is as good as every other” and the view that “we have 
to work out from the networks we are, from the communities with which 
we presently identify” (Rorty 1983:202). Following Rorty, the Muslim 
woman need not look for a universal and transhistorical justiﬁcation to 
defend the claim that sexual discrimination is wrong. She can appeal to 
the practices of other cultures and to the vision of a shared egalitarian 
future. As Rorty (1990:57) argues, to indicate
…that we need meta-narratives, and universalistic philosophical theories, 
as a platform to condemn, e.g., patriarchy, suggests that such meta-narratives 
or such theories have some intrinsic appeal—some appeal part from those 
aspects of some community’s practice oﬀ against other parts, rather than of 
comparing the practice as a whole with an idea which is currently reﬂected by 
no practices. The slow and partial progress which women have made toward 
being thought of as persons by males has, it seems to me, been achieved by 
playing oﬀ internal tensions within patriarchal practice against one another, 
rather than opening the eyes of the patriarch to truths unreﬂected in practice. 
So I think that as long as we philosophers persist in thinking that our skill is 
in detecting universals, rather than simply in winking at tensions, we shall be 
less useful than we might otherwise be. 
David is sensitive to this crucial Rortyan insight. In “Asian Values 
and Global Standards,” David explains Rorty’s view, saying that while 
we do not have a metaphysical and transcultural basis for criticizing other 
cultures, we do have a social and political basis for doing so: “One can 
avoid being chauvinistic about one’s culture or condescending to other 
cultures, but retain the capacity for moral indignation when one’s own 
values are violated” (2006b). The fact of ethnocentrism is therefore not 
a reason for the paralysis of cultural criticism; rather, it is the standpoint 
from which reﬂection and criticism could begin. 
Meanwhile, Rorty’s local ethnocentrism—one characterized by 
his impassioned vindication of a Western-centric and liberal ethnos—
is often perceived by critics as a divisive stance. Marianne Janack 
(1998:10) points out that Rorty is prone to speaking from “the equally 
exalted and privileged position of the conquering and dominant (socially, 
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politically, economically, and culturally) group.” She argues that 
feminists and minorities, while part of Rorty’s own liberal communities, 
may not necessarily share his interpretation of equal and just practices. 
In a similar but more derisive vein, Jenny Teichman (1998:60) rebukes 
Rorty’s constant reference to his ethnos:
The we-talk so typical of this author… appears now and then, as when he 
insists (thump, thump, thump) that “we no longer believe in God.” Who is this 
“we”? one asks. Well plainly it is he, Rorty—and come to that it is also me 
most of the time. At this point, however, a list of real, contemporary, living-
and-breathing, God-believing philosophers, physicists, biologists, academic 
lawyers—and even a few professors of theology—appear before the mind’s 
eye. Rorty must be living a pretty hermetic kind of life if he has never heard 
of these other we’s. And what about the teeming Hindu millions of India and 
Nepal and Sri Lanka? What about the Jews who keep the Sabbath in every 
country in the world? What about all those Catholics in South America? What 
about the Irish? What about Islam? Perhaps, for Rorty, these people are not 
we. Perhaps they are only them.
In short, Rorty seems to be guilty of perpetuating a divisive approach. 
This charge can be responded to in at least two ways. The ﬁrst response is 
to recognize that Rorty ﬁnds nothing wrong about being Western-centric 
and liberal because the option to be non-ethnocentric does not exist; to 
repeat, Rorty’s primary thesis is that ethnocentrism is an inescapable 
condition. Hence, his political identity is a product of contingency and 
choice, being raised in the United States and deciding to commit to a 
social character that embodies the particular system of values that he 
admires. David understands this Rortyan argument well: “Whatever they 
are, the speciﬁc values we pursue are not entirely self-chosen. They are 
mainly determined for us by the community and the times into which we 
are born, as well as by the particular gifts with which we are endowed. 
They are ‘contingent’ in the sense that they could have been other than 
what they are” (David 2013). Hence, for Rorty, an eﬀective conversation 
between diﬀering cultures is not a matter of standing up for what is 
universal and righteous for all. Instead, it is a matter of persuading the 
listener that one’s set of contingencies in terms of values and practices is 
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preferable and admirable over others. For instance, he suggests that moral 
claims can be better justiﬁed if people were more “frankly ethnocentric” 
than if they insist that their views were universal and rational: “It would 
be better to say: here is what we in the West look like as a result of 
ceasing to hold slaves, beginning to educate women, separating church 
and state, and so on. Here is what happened after we started treating 
certain distinctions between people as arbitrary rather than fraught with 
moral signiﬁcance” (Rorty [1997] 2010:443). 
The second response is that Rorty’s use of “we” has strategic and 
rhetorical value. Rondel (2009) suggests that Rorty is not alone in 
employing this strategy to strengthen the force of their argument: “We 
pragmatists,” or “We postmodern bourgeois liberals” are no more 
problematic locutions than Nietzsche’s “We moderns,” “We fearless 
ones,” or “We good Europeans.” It is not that Nietzsche or Rorty are 
trying to gesture at some clearly distinguishable group of persons, 
they are issuing a rally-call (Rondel 2009:65). Baruchello and Weber 
(2014:204) point out that the rhetorical aim of Rorty’s “we” could be 
persuasion, communion, and identiﬁcation. In their view, Rorty’s style of 
writing is designed to convince others of the advantages that come with 
his democratic, tolerant, and free ethnos.
EGOTISM
I have so far presented the responses to the general criticisms against 
Rorty’s view. But even if ethnocentrism could be adequately defended 
from the charges of groundless relativism and unwarranted divisiveness, 
there still remains something discomﬁting about the use of the term. In 
my view, the tension lies in the self- or culture-centeredness that this 
concept connotes, one that is keen to distinguish between members and 
outsiders, one that fundamentally separates the “us” from the “them” as 
Teichman harps in her critique of Rorty’s work. Rorty is aware of the 
controversial character of ethnocentrism; in fact, he admits that if he could 
come up with a better replacement, he would abandon the term altogether 
(Rorty 2001b:111). Since we cannot discard the utility of the concept 
of ethnocentrism, Rorty states that as good pragmatists, “We should 
use it—should play oﬀ our preferred ethnic against others, rather than 
comparing them all with something that is not a set of actual, or at least 
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concretely imagined, human practices” (1990:58). However, it should be 
borne in mind that Rorty has been clear from the start that he endorses a 
particularly outward-looking kind of ethnocentrism. The contextual and 
historical ethnocentrism of the liberal community he champions opposes 
any kind of culture that banks on its self- and culture-centeredness. The 
culture of liberalism is designed to expand its membership rather than to 
close its borders, at least in Rorty’s view. A “bourgeois” (a description 
which Rorty later disavowed) liberal culture prides itself best on a culture 
of tolerance, open-mindedness, and cosmopolitanism:
It is a culture which prides itself on constantly adding more windows, 
constantly enlarging its sympathies. It is a form of life which is constantly 
extending pseudopods and adapting itself to what it encounters. Its sense 
of its own moral worth is founded on its tolerance of diversity. The heroes 
it apotheosizes include those who have enlarged its capacity for sympathy 
and tolerance. Among the enemies it diabolizes are people who attempt to 
diminish this capacity, the vicious ethnocentrists. (Rorty [1986] 1991:204)
Rorty thus diﬀerentiates his own outward-oriented and self-enlarging 
liberal ethnos against ethnocentrism of the vicious kind. The challenge now 
is to ﬁnd a way to slough oﬀ the contentious character of ethnocentrism in 
order to distinguish Rorty’s culture-expanding message in a more eﬀective 
way. In my view, it is possible to delineate the idea of a vicious form of 
ethnocentrism by employing a concept that appears in his later writings. 
The term for this concept is egotism (Rorty 2001a; [2004] 2010). 
Egotism, for Rorty, is a position of militant self-conﬁdence in one’s 
views, beliefs, and associations. An egotistic perspective is self-righteous 
and often inconsiderate of other human needs, values, and purposes (for a 
more thorough treatment of Rorty’s egotism, see Llanera 2016). Egotism 
is manifested in various forms, and in the following discussion I point 
out two ways in which egotistic behavior is socially encouraged. First, it 
should be acknowledged that the dominant political and cultural forms 
of authority in a speciﬁc society often fuel egotistic belief and behavior. 
Dogmatic claims originating from these disciplines and institutions 
could impose a tone of ﬁnality to any conversation and discourage self-
questioning and meaningful discourse. In “Religion in the Public Square: 
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A Reconsideration,” Rorty points out the widespread and systematized 
egotism that institutional religion propagates. He states that “Catholic 
bishops, the Mormon General Authorities, the televangelists, and all the 
other religious professionals who devote themselves not to pastoral care 
but to promulgating orthodoxy and acquiring economic and political 
clout” remain inﬂuential (Rorty [2003] 2010:456). Often demanding pure 
adherence from its followers, their positions are prone to stand against 
the important democratic goals of pluralism and social cooperation, 
according to Rorty. In Philippine politics in particular, David points 
out that religion has this kind of eﬀect and that people in power make 
claims based on their religious beliefs unreﬂectively. Chief Justice Maria 
Lourdes Sereno’s act of referencing her 2012 appointment to the Supreme 
Court as the result of God’s will serves as a good example. In “God, law, 
psychology, and [Chief Justice] Sereno,” David (2012) notes that this act 
is a form of a “conversation stopper,” pointing out that “it is one thing 
to be guided by one’s faith in everything one does, and quite another to 
lace one’s daily speech with eﬀusive references to God… People at the 
receiving end of this form of communication ﬁnd themselves unable to 
decide whether to take the speaker seriously and engage her, or to just 
change the topic.” 
Second, egotism is encouraged by membership in groups that 
valorize a particular social identity. A strong association with a particular 
community, for instance, requires a level of likeness from its members—
e.g., correspondence in faith, race, or social purpose—in order for a 
person to properly belong. Outsiders who fail to meet this expectation 
are not attributed the same level of attention and importance, and at times 
they are perceived as unworthy of respect. In this way, exclusivity and 
inclusion in groups can breed egotism, for members are habituated to feel 
at best with people they perceive as their equals or as part of their kin. A 
person’s sense of religious, intellectual, or ethical superiority over others 
thus serves as the source of feelings of indiﬀerence, intolerance, and hate. 
In other words, egotism restricts the ability to empathize with outsiders. 
As Rorty ([1993] 2001:359) illustrates: “The problem is the gallant and 
honorable Serb who sees Muslims as circumcised dogs. It is the brave 
soldier and good comrade who loves and is loved by his mates, but who 
thinks of women as dangerous, malevolent whores and bitches.”
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As a counterpoint to egotism, we can utilize David’s description of 
the virtues of tolerance and solidarity in “Ten Virtues for a New World” 
to characterize what it means for a culture to be non-egotistic. David 
deﬁnes tolerance as “the capacity to accept diﬀerence and not to feel 
threatened by it. Its opposite is bigotry, the tendency to judge others by 
one’s own unexamined beliefs” and describes solidarity as “the capacity 
to feel the pain of others by an imaginative identiﬁcation with their 
situation… Its opposite is selﬁshness and self-absorption, the tendency 
to think that life is all about getting ahead and looking after oneself or 
one’s kin” (David 2000a). Tolerance and solidarity could be framed 
as underdeveloped virtues in intolerant and inward-looking groups. 
Egotistic communities, roughly put, often have insuﬃcient impetus 
within their network to change their perspectives and behavior since their 
biases and prejudices are entrenched. While they behave with respect 
and decency toward people they care for, they are often unable to stretch 
their empathy toward those outside their circle, and are even taught to be 
suspicious of them. If applied to Rorty’s work, these egotistic cultures 
would represent the vicious and close-minded ethnocentrism that his own 
tolerant, cosmopolitan, and democratic liberal culture opposes (Rorty 
[1986] 1991:204). The challenge, in this case, is to ﬁnd a way of ungluing 
the motivational inward-looking grip of social egotism over its members 
and having them adopt a more outward-looking ethnos.
CONCEPTUAL TOOLS
With the help of David’s writings, I have presented how Rorty’s concept 
of ethnocentrism could be distinguished from ethnocentrism’s deplorable 
form: Egotism. The former serves as an umbrella concept that refers to 
the particular and historical character of each culture or community. 
Meanwhile, the latter refers to a speciﬁcally “vicious” ethnocentrism—
one that is maliciously relativist and unapologetically divisive (Rorty 
[1986] 1991:204). It must be noted that the term “ethnocentrism” could 
still not be dispensed with as Rorty had previously hoped. However, this 
article has at least attended to the task of clarifying Rorty’s controversial 
idea of ethnocentrism with the introduction of a targeted and possibly 
more functional concept in political and social theory (see Rorty 
2001b:111; 1990:58). Egotism is the enemy of Rorty’s liberal ethnos that 
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his sympathizers and critics alike should ﬁght against. Cultures seeped 
in egotism represent an ethnocentrism that is resistant to openness, 
creativity, and social transformation. By way of conclusion, I now make 
three simple suggestions to show how Rorty’s notions of ethnocentrism 
and egotism might be of some use as conceptual tools for articulating the 
contemporary social situation in the Philippines.
First, David’s “Public Lives” column in the Philippine Daily Inquirer 
is a good start. His current writings are informed by a keen interest 
in interpreting the state of the Philippines under President Rodrigo 
Duterte’s administration (see David 2016b, 2017a, 2017b). In these 
works, David deals with the concepts of populism and global public 
opinion to contextualize his analysis of a new kind of world, one in 
which “the triumph of Trump, the emergence of Duterte, and, not least, 
the recuperation of the memory of Ferdinand Marcos, the ultimate 
strongman, are all symptoms of a populist backlash against a complex 
globalized world in which ordinary people ﬁnd no security” (David 
2016b). Populism, following Pierre-André Taguieﬀ’s deﬁnition, is a kind of 
politics involving “direct appeals to the people, rejection of mediation, 
and criticism of established elites. This also includes the promise of 
change, a rhetorical gesture that populist leaders have in common with 
all modern political leaders. But they diﬀer from the latter by featuring a 
charismatic authority, which explains the fact that they are either admired 
or hated with equal intensity” (2017a). Framing this deﬁnition in relation 
to Rorty’s framework enables one to recast old questions about populism 
afresh as well as invite new and more creative answers. My hunch is that 
Rorty’s writings on egotism and ethnocentrism could supply researchers 
with a social and political vocabulary that is already comfortable in 
dealing with the problems of relativism and divisiveness and the realities 
of contingency and change. An advantage of Rorty’s pragmatism is that 
it dissuades people from appealing to objective maxims and universals, 
a strategy that has often served as conversation-stoppers in discourses 
on populism (for instance, the problem of defending human rights on 
metaphysical grounds in David 2016c). Questions can range from the 
simple to the ambitious: Are Filipino populists egotists in the Rortyan 
sense? If so, what conditions constitute their social egotism? What does 
succumbing to populism say about the Filipino ethnos? What are the 
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common motivations between local and global forms of populism? What 
can be done to curb the spread of populist egotism?
The second way of engaging ethnocentrism and egotism is by 
identifying what could be considered as egotistic subcultures within 
contemporary Filipino society. Given Rorty’s broad characterization, 
Filipino egotists can range from Catholic biblical literalists to science 
freethinkers to hardcore Duterte supporters. Often ﬂanked by resistance 
and opposition, it would be worth interrogating the nature of these various 
groups’ egotisms. This analysis would help unmask the drive behind their 
egotism and, more productively, hypothesize how their particular version 
of egotism could be overcome. For instance, Nicole Curato’s “Politics of 
Anxiety, Politics of Hope: Penal Populism and Duterte’s Rise to Power” 
(2016) oﬀers a good examination of the much demeaned and pathologized 
“egotistic” subculture of the Dutertards. Her work investigates the all-
too-reasonable motivations behind Duterte’s public appeal and concludes 
that support for the notorious leader is undergirded by the public’s 
“seemingly opposing, yet mutually reinforcing, logics of the politics 
of fear and the politics of hope” (Curato 2016:106). By identifying the 
conceptual, political, and social conditions that have made their egotism 
rife in the ﬁrst place, analyzing a particular group’s egotism could then 
serve as a preliminary step toward attending to these underlying issues.  
This leads me to the third and ﬁnal suggestion—one that pertains to 
the task of imagining the future of the Filipino nation and its democratic 
hopes. If Filipino sociologists and intellectuals were to envision an 
edifying conception of the Filipino ethnos, Rorty’s work could serve as 
a reminder that this process should aim for a non-egotistic version of it. 
Fortunately, David has had a head start: The quest for a non-egotistic 
sense of a Filipino ethnos is already a radical democratic hope that 
inspires his work. As he beautifully writes, in closing:
When the philosopher Richard Rorty wrote about the quest for social 
solidarity in our time, he was referring not to the ritualistic charities that deﬁne 
our futile attempts at redressing inequality, but to our gradual awakening 
as human beings to the reality of our own unwitting participation in the 
oppression and exploitation of others. Such an awakening shifts our attention 
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from the limited mortals that we are to the kind of society we have created for 
ourselves. To be able to watch ourselves collectively as a nation—that is the 
mark of a modern society. But to be able to revise our notions of who we are 
and what we can be—that is the quality of a great people. (David 2008)
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